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Can Police Search Your
CeLL Phone, and Even
Breal< Your Password,
During an Arrest?
ver the las t decade, cell phone use has exploded.
Many Americans now carry incredible amounts of
information in their phones, including pictures,
documents, music, text messages, and emails. Not surprisingly, the fac t that cell phones are carried in public and
hold enormous amounts of data has made them attractive
targets for law enforcement.

O

This is a condensed version of a previously published article. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected?
Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search
Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125 (2011) (reprinted
with permission).

In rece n t yea rs,
prosec uto rs have so ught
to admit evidence fro m
cell ph o ne sea rches
based o n the sea rch
incident to arrest doctrine. T hat doctrine which has been used by
police on the street fo r
decades - all ows po li ce
to conduct a complete
sea rch of the items on
a n arrestee fo llowing
any custodial arres t.
Searchin g cell ph o nes
fo llowin g an arrest
obviously gives law
enfo rcem ent access to
fa r more informati on
than a traditional sea rch
of a wallet o r jacket
pocket. Yet m any courts
have ag reed with prosecuto rs and upheld cell
pho ne sea rches incident
to arrest, even if th ere
was no reason for law
enfo rcem ent to believe
the pho ne conta ined
evidence related to the
arrest.
This article discusses the stunningly broad
scope of the sea rch incident to arrest doctrine
as applied to cell
phones. After explaining why curren t Suprem e Co urt
precedent seemingly authorizes such broad searches, the
article goes a step further and explores a question that
co urts have not yet been forced to confront: Ca n police
search cell phones that have been passwo rd protected?
Password-protected phones raise to ugh issues, including
whether police ca n try to break a password themselves
without an owner's consent, and whether they ca n demand
that an arrestee turn over the password without violating
Miranda or the Fifth Amendment protectio n aga inst selfincrimination. Although the answers to these questions are
tricky, the bo ttom line is that police authority under the
search incident to arrest doctrine is so vast that even password protecting the phone leaves defendants with minimal
legal protection . In the end, if the Supreme Court m aintains its current search incident to arrest doctrine, littl e will
stand in the way of police extracting enormous info rmation from defendants' cell phones, even witho ut a warrant
or probable cause.

The Supreme Court's Search
Incident to Arrest Doctrine
The starting point fo r the broad sea rch incident to
arrest doctrine is the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in
Chime! v. California.' In Chimel, the Court supp ressed evi-
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dence found when police sea rched Ted
Chimel's entire home, including his attic
and garage, following an arrest for burglary. Despite suppressing the evidence,
the Chimel decision provided broad
authority for the police to search incident
to arrest. The Court held that contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, police could
search for weapons that an arrestee could
use against the officer and to prevent an
arrestee from concealing or destroying
evidence. The Court limited the scope of
the search to the arrestee's perso n and the
area within his immediate control from
which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destroy evidence. Thus, while
police cou ld not rummage through
Chimel's entire house following arrest,
they were free to search anywhere on his
person or his immediate grabbing space.
A few years after Chimel, in United
States v. Robinson, the Court moved a step
further and clarified that police could
open closed containers when searching
incident to arrest.' Police arrested Willie
Robinson for the crime of operating a
motor vehicle with a revoked license.
During a search incident to arrest of
Robinson's person, the arresting officer
felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket
but was unsure of what it was. The officer
reached into the pocket and pulled out a
crumpled cigarette package. Still unsure
what was in the package, the officer
opened it and discovered capsules of
heroin. Even though Robinson was not
initially arrested for a drug crime and the
officer had no reason to believe the package in his pocket contained drugs, the
Supreme Court upheld the search. The
Court announced a bright-line rule permitting police officers to open and sea rch
through all items on an arrestee's person,
even if they are in a closed container, and
even if the officers have no suspicion that
the contents of the container are illegal.
In its next series of important sea rch
incident to arrest decisions, the Supreme
Court turned its attention to automobiles.
In the first case - New York v. Belton' the Court expanded its bright-line rule to
permit searches incident to arrest of the
entire interior of automobiles (although
not the trunk) following a valid arrest. In
Belton, the officer stopped a car for speeding and, upon smelling marijuana, arrested the occupants. With the occupants
safely removed frol11 the vehicle, the officer then searched the passenger compartment of the car and found a jacket in the
backseat. The officer unzipped the jacket
pockets and found cocaine. In upholding
the search of the jacket, the Co urt
explained the value of "a straightforward
rule, easily applied and predictably
WWW.NACDl.ORG

enforced.'" To make matters simple and
predictabl e, the Co urt permitted police,
following a lawful arrest, to search the
entire passenger compartment of a vehicle
and to open any containers inside the
vehicle rega rdl ess of whether they could
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime.
After years of expanding the scope of
the sea rch incident to arrest doctrine, the
Supreme Court scaled back police authority to search vehicles incident to arrest in
2009. In Arizona v. Cant,"' police arrested
the defendant for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him, and placed
him in the back of a police car. Thereafter,
police searched Rodney Gant's vehicle and
found a jacket in the backseat that contained cocaine. The Cant Court narrowed
the Belton rule and held that police can
only search a vehicle incident to arrest if
"the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the sea rch" or if"it
is reasonabl e to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in
the vehicle." " While the Cant decision is
clearly an effort to narrow the search incident to arrest doctrine, at present the decision is only applicable to searches of vehicles and it is debatable how much change
it will foster.

Searching Cell Phones
Incident to Arrest
As wireless technology has become
ubiquitous, courts have been called upon
to apply the sea rch incident to arrest doctrine to digital devices. The first such
cases began to appear in the mid-1990s
and involved very simple pagers and
beepers that stored only phone numbers
and short messages. Courts universally
upheld the search incident to arrest of
such devices. For example, in United
States v. Chan,' police activated a pager
and retrieved telephone numbers that
linked Sam Chan to a drug ring. The federal court upheld the search of Chan's
pager because it was nothing more than
an electronic container and Supreme
Court precedent authorized the search of
containers incident to arrest. The court
further explained that it was irrelevant
that the arrestee could not retrieve a
weapon from the pager nor plausibly
destroy any evidence from the pager. Put
simply, the court embraced the sea rch
incident to arrest doctrine's bright-line
rule for wireless technology and saw no
reason to distinguish pagers from traditional searches of luggage, boxes, and
other containers. Following Chan, half a
dozen other courts upheld similar searches of pagers. 8

In the years following the Chan decision upholding th e sea rch in ciden t to
arrest of pagers, cell phone use increased
dramatically in the United Sta tes. Early
generation cell phones were not markedly
different than pagers, but did contain
additional data such as outgoing call logs
and text messages. And law enforcement
officers quickly recognized that drug dealers could use cell phones to text their drug
transactions without having to spea k on
the phone. Accordingly, police began to
sea rch cell phones incident to arrest and
courts were called upon beginning in the
mid-2000s to assess the constitutionality
of such searches.
Although it is impossible to know
how many cell phone searches have been
conducted incident to arrest over the last
few yea rs, the number is likely in the thousands: [n many instances, police likely
found nothing incriminating and in other
cases defendants likely pleaded guilty
without challenging the constitutionality
of the sea rches. Nevertheless, more than
50 defendants have challenged the warrantless search of ea rly generation cell
phon es over the last few years. In a handful of cases, courts have addressed
whether these warrantless sea rches were
permissible under the automobile exception,'" the inventory exception," the exigency exception,' 2 or based on consent."
The bulk of warrantless cell phone searches, however, have been decided under the
search inciden t to arrest doctri ne, and
courts have upheld the searches in the vast
majority of cases.'"
The most prominent case upholding
the search incident to arrest of a cell
phone is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Finley.' s After arresting
Jacob Finley as part of a staged drug sale,
police searched the cell phone in his pocket incident to arrest. Officers found
incriminating text messages related to
drug trafficking, and Finley was subsequently convicted.
On appeal, Finley contended that the
search of his cell phone was unlawful
because the Fourth Amendment permitted only the seizure, not the warrantless
search, of his phone. Just as in the pager
context, the Fifth Circuit refused to draw a
distinction between wireless technology
and searches of more traditional containers. The court explained that "police officers are not constrained to search only for
weapons or instruments of escape on the
arrestee's person; they may also, without
any additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person
in order to preserve it for use at trial."'· In
short, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize
any conceptual difference between search-
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ing physical containers for drugs and
sea rching electronic equipment for digital
information.
Although the Finley decision has
been cited repeatedly as the leading decision, a small number of courts have
refused to follow its reasoning." These
courts have employed a variety of rationales in rejecting warrantless searches of
cell phones.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a recent
and closely divided 4-3 opinion, is the
most prominent court to reject th e search
incident to arrest of cell phones.' 8 In State
v. Smith, the police executed a controlled
drug-buy in which text messages and call
records from the arrestee's phone confirmed his involvement in the drug sale.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit panel in Finley,
th e Ohio Supreme Co urt refused to
accept the crucial premise that cell
phones are just like any other container
that might hold other objects inside. The
four-justice majority maintained that to
be a container under the Supreme Court's
decision in Belton, the item must be capable of holding a "physical object within
it." '? Because cell phones hold only intangible data, they could not be containers.
Moreover, the majority ruled that the
search incident to arrest doctrine should
not apply to cell phones because even
basic cell phones "are capable of storing a
wealth of digitized information wholly
unlike any physical object found within a
closed container." 20 The co urt thus
authorized police to seize a cell phone
incident to arrest, but demanded that
police obtain a warrant before "intruding
into th e phone's contents.""
A federal district judge in California
offered a different rationale for rejecting
th e search incid ent to arrest of cell
phones. In United States v. Park, the defen dant was arrested on drug charges and
brought to the police station. 22 At the station, approximately 90 minutes following
the arrest, the police sea rched his cell
phone and located incriminating information. Like the Ohio Supreme Court,
the Park court focused on the "immense
amounts of private information" that can
be stored on cell phones, explaining that
"address books, ca lendars, vo ice and text
messages, email, video, and pictures"
could revea l "highly personal informa tion."" However, the Park court did not
reject the idea that cell phones were containers. Rather, the court asserted that cell
phones "should not be characterized as an
element of [an ] individual 's clothing or
jJerson, but rather as a possession within
an arrestee's immediate control that has
Fourth Amendment protection at the sta tion house."21The Park co urt pointed to a
WWW . NACDL . ORG

famous Supreme Court case - United
States v. Chadwick - in which the Court
rej ected the sea rch incident to arrest of a
large footlocker that had been transported
to the police station. The Chadwick decision seemed to draw a distinction between
searches of the person, such as clothing or
a cigarette package in a pocket, and
searches of possessions within an
arrestee's immediate control, such as a
footlocker. According to the Park court's
interpretation of the Chadwick decision,
items associated with the person of the
arrestee can be searched at the scene or
later at the police station, but items within the arrestee's immediate control can
only be searched incident to arrest at the
scene, not later at the police station. The
Park court then determined that because
of the sheer volume of private information held on cell phones, they should be
considered possessions within the
arrestee's immediate control. And because
the search incident to arrest of Park's cell
phone occurred at the station, it was
impermissible.
At least two courts have offered a
third rationale for suppressing searches of
cell phones by looking to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Arizona v.
Cant." In Cant, the Supreme Court
restricted searches incident to arrest of
automobiles to situations in which "the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search" or "when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle."2" The Court's decision in Cant
was clearly limited to searches of automobiles incident to arrest, but these two
courts evidently believed that the Court's
logic extended (or should be extended in
the future) to cell phones as well.
Finally, a number of courts have suppressed evidence found in searches of cell
phones incident to arrest on the grounds
that the search was not contemporaneous
and occurred too long after the arrest. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Diaz, the
arrestee's cell phone repeatedly rang while
he was being booked at the police station."
Eventually, an officer answered the phone
and heard the caller attempt to buy drugs.
Relying in part on the fact that the officer
answered the phone 20 minutes after
arrest, a Massachusetts court suppressed
evid ence of the phone call because it
occurred too long after arrest to be contemporaneous. In United States v. LaSalle,
a federal district judge grappled with a
much lengthier tim e gap when police
searched a cell phone at least two hours
after the suspect was initially arrested. 2"
The court concluded that such a time peri-

od was not contemporaneous with arrest
and
suppressed
the
evidence.29
Importantly, these contemporaneousness
cases limit, but do not outrightly forbid,
the sea rch incident to arrest of cell phones.

Can a Password Save Your
Cell Phone From the Search
Incident to Arrest Doctrine?
As members of the public increasingly become aware that police are conducting warrantless cell phone searches following arrests, they will likely begin to password protect their phones. To date, courts
have not been called upon to address
police authority to bypass passwords during searches incident to arrest, but that
issue will surely arise in the near future.

Can Police Attempt to
Break Into a
Password-Protected Phone?
Assum ing that cell phone users opt to
password protect their phones, the first
important question is whether police can
attempt to decipher and enter the password without the owner's permission in
order to access the data on the phone. The
answer to this question depends on
whether police have authority to break
into a locked container.
Alth ough the search incident to
arrest doctrine has existed for over 70
years, the Supreme Court has never clearly stated whether police are permitted to
unlock containers when searching incident to arrest. Nevertheless, the Court's
decision in New York v. Belton (authorizing the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle) broadly stated that
police could search "any" containers,
whether "open or closed.")U And the dissenting justices in Belton clearly expressed
their belief that the decision extended to
locked conta iners.!1
In the years since Belton, there has
been a fair amount of consensus among
lower courts permitting police to enter
locked containers as long as the officers do
not irreparably damage them. For example, over the last three decades, courts
have almost unanimously32 held that
police may open locked glove compartments during searches incident to arrest.'·l
Some courts have gone beyond glove
compartments to permit searches incident to arrest of even more secure containers such as locked safes,'" locked footlockers,'s locked briefcases,'" boxes sealed
with tape," and locked overnight bags."
Based on these decisions, it would
seem clear that police can attempt to crack
a cell phone password during a search
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incident to arrest. Just as police are permitted to try all of the keys on the defend ant's keychain until locating the one that
unlocks the glove compartment, police
should be able to try multiple different
combinations in an effort to discover the
password to the phone.

How Long Can Police Spend
Trying to Crack a Password?
Assuming that police ca n search a
password-protected phone, a harder question is how long th ey ca n take in trying to
break the passwo rd. Unfortunately, th e
Supreme Court has never established any
clear guideposts for what co nstitutes a
contemporaneous search. And , in fact, the
Court has created a confusing rule whereby the length of time depends o n whether
the police are sea rching an item o n the
person of an arrestee, as opposed to property near the arrestee.

Searching Items Associated
With the Person and
Items That Are Merely
Nearby Possessions
In determining how long police can
spend trying to crack a passwo rd , the best

place to begin is the question of whether
cell phones are items immediately associated with the arrestee or m erely possessio ns near the arrestee. This distinction
requires us to parse two Supreme Court
cases fro m the 1970s.
In the somewhat obscure Supreme
Court case of United States v. Edwards,
police arrested Eugene Edwards at 11 p.m.
for attempting to break into a government
build ing.J9 Edwards was promptly brought
to jail, processed, and placed in a cell.
Overnight, police discovered that the perpetrator had attempted to enter a wooden
window and that he would lil<ely have
paint chips fro m the window on his clothing. The following m orning, 10 hours after
his arrest, police took Edwards' clothing
fro m him to sea rch for paint chips.
Edwards moved to suppress the evidence
o n the grounds that tl1e search of his
clothes occurred too long after arrest to fall
within the search incident to arrest exception. The Court rejected Edwards' argument and gave police wide authority to
conduct the sea rch incident to arrest well
after the arrest was conducted.
Three years later, in the far more
fa m ous Supreme Court case of United
States v. Chadwick, officers arrested Joseph
Chadwick as he was trying to load a double- locked footlocker into his vehicle. lo

One set of agents brought Chadwick to a
federal building and another group of
agents followed behind witl1 the footlocker. Approximately 90 minutes after the
arrest, federal agents opened the footlocker and discovered a large quantity of marijuana. Unlike in Edwards, the Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument
that the footlocker could be searched incident to arrest. In a brief footnote, the
Court distinguished Edwards by explaining that " [uJnlike searches of the person,
searches of possessions within an arrestee's
immediate control cannot be justified by
any reduced expectation s of privacy
caused by the arrest:"" The Court further
explained that " [0] nce law enfo rcement
officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated
with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and tl1ere is no longer
any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or
destroy evidence, a search of that property
is no longer an incident of the arrest."·"
The Court's decisions in Edwards
and Chadwick thus offer two different
rules for the temporal scope of searches
incident to arrest. If the search is of items
associated with the person, police have
great flexibility and can condu ct the
search many hours after arrest. If, howev-
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er, the police search possessions that are
not associated with the person and are
merely nearby, then there is a more rigid
time limitation. In the three-and-a-half
decades since the decisions in Edwards
and Chadwick, the Supreme Court has
offered no additional guidance.
Decisions by lower courts, however,
have concluded that many items are associated with the person of an arrestee. In
addition to clothing, courts have concluded that wallets," purses,"' dufflebags; 5and
backpacks'· fall under Edwards because
they more closely resemble items on the
person rather than nearby possessions like
the footlocker in Chadwick.

Cell Phones Will Often
Be Associated With
The Person, Allowing a
Lengthy Time to Search
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In order to determine how long
police can spend trying to crack a cell
phone password, courts must first determine whether the phone falls under
Edwards or Chadwick. Most courts deciding searches incident to arrest of cell
phones have not addressed this question,
and the ones that have undertaken the
task have reached conflicting results.
A few courts have held that cell
phones constitute possessions associated
with the person of an arrestee under
Edwards and that law enforcement officers have flexibility in how long they take
to search the phones incident to arrest."
Once again, the key case supporting this
approach is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Finley.'s The Fifth Circuit
specifically held that Finley's phone
should not fall into the Chadwick category of nearby possessions because the cell
phone "was on his person at the time of
his arrest.""
By contrast, a federal court in
California concluded that cell phones fell
into the Chadwick box and rejected a
search conducted 90 minutes after arrest
at the police station. In United States v.
Park, police arrested the defendant on
marijuana charges and transported him
to the police station. 50 As Edward Park was
being booked, police removed a cell
phone from him and placed it into an
envelope for safekeeping. Because the
investigating officer believed the phone
might have evidence of marijuana trafficking, he instructed other officers to
search it. The Park court concluded that
cell phones "should be considered 'possessions within an arrestee's immediate control' and not part of 'the person."'5t The
court reached this conclusion because:
WWW.NACDL.ORG

[Clellular phones have the
capacity for storing immense
amounts of private information.
Unlike pagers or address books,
modern cell phon es record
incoming and outgoing calls,
and can also contain address
books, calendars, voice and text
messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on their
cell phones, and can record their
most private thoughts and con versations on their cell phones
through email and text, voice
and instant messages.-"
In the battle between the Finley reasoning (that cell phones are associated
with the person of the arrestee) and the
Park view (that phones are merely nearby
possessions), the Park court appears to
have the weaker side of the argument.
First, courts have repeatedly held that wallets found in arrestees' pockets (as well as
purses and backpacks on an arrestee)
should be considered items associated
with the person of the arrestee that can be
searched at the station house under
Edwards. When a cell phone is found in an
arrestee's pocket, precedent therefore
strongly suggests it should be searchahlp
at the station house under Edwards.
Second, the Park court took the position that cell phones are possessions within the arrestee's immediate control
because they contain a wealth of private
information. Yet, t11e court offered no
e:h.'Planation why the quantity of information held in a phone had anything to do
with whether it was associated with his
person or merely a nearby possession. If a
large quantify of information precluded
an item from being associated with the
person of an arrestee, then arguably a wallet should be categorized similarly because
it contains information about where the
arrestee banks (via his ATM card), where
he shops (via his rewards cards), whether
he has any medical conditions (via medical cards), pictures of his children, and
more scandalous information such as
motel key cards, condoms, or the phone
number of his mistress. These items do
not cease to be on the person of an
arrestee simply because they convey a
wealth of information.
Moreover, the idea that an electronic
container cannot be associated with the
person of an arrestee is inconsistent with
the use of cell phones in everyday life.
Many people exercise with an iPhone
securely strapped to their anns. It is difficult to comprehend how a cell phone that
is literally attached to an arrestee's arm

could not be associated with the person of
an arrestee. Yet, under the Park court's reasoning, cell phones could never be associated with th e perso n of the arrestee
beca use they contain too much data.
In som e instances, such as cases
where the phone is found in a briefcase or
sitting on the fro nt passenger seat of a
vehicle, it makes sense to say a cell phone
is a possession near the arrestee. Yet, in
cases wh ere the cell phone is in the
arrestee's pocket, attached to his arm, or
clipped to his belt, it is far less compelling
to suggest th at the phone is never associated with the person of an arrestee.
In short, there is no absolute answer
to the question of whether a cell phone
should be considered an item associated
with the person of an arrestee (that can be
searched hours after arrest under
Edwards) or m erely a nearby possession
(that must be searched shortly after arrest
under Chadwick ). The best answer is simply that the categorization depends on the
specific facts of the case. In some instances
police should be permitted to search the
cell phone hours after arrest at the police
station, whereas in other cases such elongated searches should be forbidden .

How Long Can Police Spend
Searching Cell Phones
Before the Search Ceases
To Be Contemporaneous?
Even if cell phones are possessions
near an arrestee that can be searched for
only a short period of time under
Chadwick, a determination still must be
made regarding how long officers can
search at the scene of the arrest. Are officers limited to five minutes after arrest, or
can police officers take much longer?
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to
this question.
Although the Supreme Court has
trumpeted the need for bright-line rules
in the search incident to arrest contn1,
the Court has refused to adopt a brightline rule dictating how long police can
take to conduct such searches.53 Not surprisingly, lower court decisions often
appear to be completely inconsistent with
one another. s.t
\Vhile courts have refused to draw
bright-line time limits on searches incident to arrest, the contours of the case law
do suggest that there is an outer time
limit in run-of-the-mill cases. It is easy to
locate hundreds of (non-cell phone)
cases in which courts permitted searches
incident to arrest five, 10,20, and even 60
minutes, after arrest. 55 But very few cases
involve searches more than an hour after
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arrest. 56 The absence of such cases suggests that there truly is an implicit outer
limit on the time to conduct searches
incident to arrest.

Will Police Have
Enough Time to
Crack the Password?
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The key remaining question is
whether, practically speaking, police will
be able to successfully crack a cell phone
password while complying with the time
limits of the search incident to arrest doctrine. The answer to this question likely
turns on where the cell phone is located
when the owner is arrested. If the cell
phone is found on an arrestee or in his
pocket, it should be considered part of his
perso n, giving police the power to bring it
to the station and search it for hours after
th e arrest. If police discover a cell phone
within the grabbing space of an arrestee,
such as in a briefcase or on the passenger
seat of an automobile, they may sea rch it
but typically must do so at the scene and
likely within minutes or at most an hour
of arrest. Thus, police may have a short
period of time to try to crack the password of a cell phone found near an
arrestee, and they may have a considerably
longer period of time to crack the password of a cell phone in the pocket of an
arrestee. As explained below, they wiIl
have trouble doing the former, but could
accomplish the latter.
If a cell phone must be searched on
the scene and police have only a few min utes to do so, the password willlil<ely prevent the police from accessing the phone's
con tents. In most cases, police will not be
able to decipher the password during the
commotion of an arrest. That sa id, it is
possible that police could occasionally
guess the password. One in five Americans
uses an overly simplistic password such as
"123456"57 and an officer might simply get
lucky by trying the most common passwords. Additionally, officers have access to
an arrestee's driver's license that contains
his birth date and home address, both of
which are commonly used as passwords.
Thus, while the chances of an officer
cracking the password in a short time on
the scene are limited, it is possible.
In the cases where poli ce bring the
cell phone to the station house beca use it
is part of the arrestee's person, the chances
of cracking the password increase dramatically, particularly for certa in phones. Take
the iPhone as an exa mple. The iPhone's
password function offers three key protections: (1) a four-digit numerical code; (2)
a req uirement that consecutively entered
incorrect passwords disable the phone for
WWW . NACDl . ORG

a short period before the user can try
another password, and (3) the option to
have the contents of the phone deleted if
the incorrect password is entered 10
times. 5" Unfortunately, these protections
are extremely weak.
A four-digit numerical code provides
only 10,000 combinations. While this
might prevent most human guessing, it
would not stop a blunt force computer
program that sequentially inputs every
numerical combination. If law enforcement utilized a very simple computer program to try all 10,000 combinations in a
row, they would be able to crack the password in minutes. While police stations
likely do not currently have such programs at their fingertips, it is quite possible they will in the near future as the technology becomes more available.
Moreover, even if police never set up
the program to crack a password, they
may be able to bypass the password altogether by hacking into the phone. One
well-known computer hacker has
authored a book called "iPhone
Forensics" that explains how to remove
data from the phone. 59 The same hacker
proudly advertises that he teaches courses
to law enforcement agencies, including
lessons on bypassing passcodes."o
Even if police agencies lack the money
or time to enroll any of their officers in
computer forensics classes, they can turn
to the numerous Internet videos that show
users how to access the data on the
iPhone.'" For some older versions of the
phone, police only need to tinker with the
device itself to bypass the password function altogether in a matter of moments.
For newer versions of the phone that have
closed earlier loopholes, police can stiLI
hack into the phone and would only need
a laptop, iTunes, and open source forensic
recovery software." In the comfort of the
police station, police could therefore gain
access to the data on a password-protected
cell phone in a matter of minutes.

The iPhone Meets the
Fifth Amendment
What happens if police are unable to
break the password on their own? Can
police ask or even demand that an arrestee
enter the password himself or verbally
provide the password? Defense counsel
will be forced to confront two legal issues:
(1) whether the Miranda doctrine offers
any legal protection, and (2) whether
police compulsion of the password violates the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination.
As is often the case, the Miranda
doctrine is not particularly helpful to the

defendant. While an arrestee is almost
certainly in custody and a request for the
password almost always will amount to
interrogation ,") invoking Miranda serves
little purpose because the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine does not apply
to Miranda violations. 6 1 While a confession that violates Miranda will be suppressed, evidence found thereafter will be
admissible. Thus, if police obtain an
arrestee's password in violation of
Miranda, the statement conceding
knowledge of the password will be
barred, but the valuable resulting evidence - the incriminating text messages
or child pornography found on the
phone - will be admissible.
An arrestee will also have a problem
seeking
relief
under
the
Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause.
While police badgering an arrestee into
disclosing his password would seem like a
quintessential Fifth Amendment violation, the Supreme Court would likely
reject such a claim because, hard as it is to
imagine, police lack the authority to compel an incriminating response for Fifth
Amendment purposes. In a 2003 plurality
decision, the Supreme Court concluded
that an individual who had been improperly interrogated could not raise a selfincrimination claim in a civil rights lawsuit because no criminal charges had ever
been filed against him and therefore he
had not been compelled to incriminate
himself in a criminal case in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 6s Put differently,
while police might have forced the individual to provide information, they did
not compel him for Fifth Amendment
purposes because the protection against
self-incrimination applies only to testimony in criminal cases. Perhaps for this
reason, the only two cases in which defendants have been compelled to disclose
their computer passwords have been in
response to grand jury subpoenas, not
police interrogation .
Accordingly, an arrestee who turned
over his password in response to police
demands would not have a strong argument that his Fifth Amendment protection aga inst self-incrimination had been
violated.

Conclusion
Password protecting a cell phone is
undoubtedly a good idea. If the phone is
lost, the password will help to protect the
data. And if an individual is arrested, the
password will make it more difficult for
police officers to search the phone incident to arrest. But password protecting
the phone will not necessarily prevent the
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police from bypassing the password and
conducting a warrantless search of the
phone. As a legal matter, password protecting the phone provides virtually no
additional protection against police
searching a cell phone incident to arrest.
Longstanding case law permits police to
attempt to open locked containers when
searching incident to arrest. Because cell
phones are often found on the person of
an arrestee, police can bring them to the
station where computer savvy officers can
spend hours attempting to hack into the
phone without first procuring a warrant.
Moreover, even if police cannot decipher
the password on their own, they stand a
strong chance of acquiring the password
from simple police interrogation.
In sum, police in many jurisdictions
have wide authority to search the contents
of cell phones - including text messages,
voicemails, photos, Internet browsing history, and reams of other data - when
searching an arrestee incident to arrest.
Given that password protecting the phone
does little to curb police power, the
Supreme Court and legislatures should
undertake efforts to sca le back law
enforcement's authority to search digital
devices incident to arrest.
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